Name:  Hilary Martin

Institutional Affiliation:  PhD Candidate, York University, Toronto, ON 

Title:  Contextualism in Evolution:  Code’s Ecological Thinking meets Williams’s Conversational Contextualism

 

Abstract:  I frame Michael Williams’s epistemological contexts as instances of Lorraine Code’s epistemological ecologies.  Though Williams fulfills Code’s requirements for intellectual honesty and due care, he is mute on which ends should orient fallibilist practice.  For Code, epistemic responsibility requires advocacy in situations of inequality, based on decisions about such ends, exemplified by Nancy Oliveri’s whistleblowing case.  Advocacy constitutes a ‘dirty hands’ approach to epistemological contexts developed in Ecological Thinking.  Incorporating advocacy improves Williams’s theory by expanding third person participation in normative engagements of assertion scorekeeping, a feature of conversational contexts not discussed by Williams.  Code may object that this omits concern for virtue and persons, her original criticism of faillibilism in Epistemic Responsibility.  However Williams clearly endorses virtue in inquiry, which turns back the skeptic at a level of personal conversational exchange not covered by Code.  As such Williams generates a new epistemological exemplar comparable to those offered by Code in the figures of Carson and Oliveri.

 

The Evolution of Western Theories of the Self and Personal Identity

 

According to a common conception, western theories of the self and personal identity divide neatly into three stages. The first of these–the soul view stage--begins with Plato, in the fourth century B.C.E., and lasts until just before John Locke, toward the end of the seventeenth century. The second–the (intrinsic) relations view stage–begins with Locke and lasts until about 1970. And the third–the (extrinsic) relations view stage–begins with Parfit et al, about 1970, and feature three major developments: the advent of an extrinsic relations (closest-continuer, externalist) view of identity over time; the resurgence of the question of what matters in survival, and the rise of four-dimensional views of persons. While there is much to be said for this traditional  sketch, the actual history of the evolution of western theories of the self and personal identity is less neat and more interesting. In this talk, we shall attempt to sketch this more interesting account and explain its implications, particularly for naturalization of the notions of the self and personal identity.

 

Raymond Martin	John Barresi
Department of Philosophy	Department of Philosophy
Union College	Dalhousie University
Schenectady, New York.	Halifax, Nova Scotia

 

 

Morality and the Rule of Law in Aristotle's Ethics

The vaunted flexibility of Aristotle’s virtue ethics comes at too steep a price, or so some critics say; for on his view there seems to be no way in which to adjudicate disagreements in value that are bound to arise in the moral life of a community. There has been a tendency in modern times to think that the arbiter of such disagreements should be an impersonal rule or law, whereas it seems for Aristotle that the final authority on right action is the good person. I will attempt to show that Aristotle thinks there is a place for principles and rules in the moral realm, even in a virtue-centric ethic. My argument is concerned to show that a purely character-based ethic neglects the external, social evaluation of actions important not only to Aristotle, but to any ethical theory. On the other hand, a purely rule-driven ethic is faced with the danger of neglecting internal considerations of motive central to the agent’s own assessment of the moral worth of her action. Ultimately, though, I will suggest that Aristotle’s ethics shows that there is a cost associated with rule-bound universalist theories that we may not be willing to pay. 

R. Majithia, Head

Department of Philosophy

Mount Allison University

Sackville, NB E4L 1G9

 

Phone: (506) 364 2337

Fax: (506) 364 2645

 

 

 

Friendship in Plato's Lysis

Doug Al-Maini, St. FX

 

ABSTRACT

 

Plato's Lysis concerns itself with determining the nature of friendship, but a satisfactory definition of the term is not made explicit in the dialogue.  After encountering a series of aporias that seem to leave the discussion fruitless, Socrates gives the following advice for resolving the dilemmas encountered so far: “Well, if there is a difference between that which belongs to us [to oikeon] and that which is like [tou homoiou], we are now, I conceive, in a condition to say what is meant by a friend” (222b).  This paper will take up the task indicated, specifically looking for other uses of the term oikeios in Plato to indicate how this concept can unravel the dilemmas given in the Lysis.

 

 

The Evolution of Internet Dating: A Philosophical Analysis of Technology Wedded To Subjectivity.

 

Abstract:

 

In this paper I examine the philosophical and ethical implications of modern internet dating practices.  The traditional concepts of interaction and communication are both being redefined by new internet dating technologies.  As such, this new link and dependence on technology raises several ethical concerns, namely that it reduces complex human beings to profiles or blocks of information, and also redefines conventional forms of communication. As a result, internet dating practices influence individual values and change the discourse of interaction in an artificial way that does not adequately represent human beings.  This raises the question: Does internet dating technology distort or enhance the nature of human experience? It will be useful to question the value of this technological transformation and explore it through a philosophical lens, specifically in relation to the philosophy of Neil Postman and David Strong.

 

Name: Arthur Labenek

Contact Information:

Tel - (613) 256-2272

848 Corkery Road

Ottawa, Ontario

K0A 1L0

Institutional Affiliation: Saint Paul University - graduate student of Public Ethics.

 

 

The Polarizing Essence of Technology

 

Neb Kujundzic, UPEI

 

Abstract:

 

In the ancient Greek terminology, "episteme" signified the broad scope of knowledge while "techne" signified what we refer to as both craft and art.  Aristotle made a significant effort to further elucidate these two important concepts, especially in his Nicomachean Ethics.  In Aristotle's theory, not only are the purely theoretical and the purely practical spheres of knowledge contrasted but they also form two different grounds for the attainment of virtue.  Episteme, characterized as pure knowledge, is an activity whose end is in itself.  Techne, on the other hand, is an activity designed to produce something separate and distinct from the very activity of making.  I take this latter feature of Aristotle's techne to be the key for understanding the nature and evolution of the current model of technology.  First, the so-called "dual" nature of technology (its propensity to be used and misused by humanity) stems from the separation of products of technology from their producers.  In the activities whose end is in itself (pure knowledge, performative arts, etc.) the activity is inexorably tied to the disposition and the character of agents who produce them.  The products of techne, in other words, tend to assume a life of their own.  Second, in my opinion, the dual nature of technology is not an accidental but an essential feature of technology.  I will argue that the necessity to polarize (polarize: "to cause to concentrate about two conflicting or contrasting positions") the entire universe belongs to the very nature of technology.

 

 

Clod Love and Pebble Love:  The Evolution of Concern

 

Glen Koehn, Huron Univ. Coll.

 

Is caring about the welfare of a beloved thing essential to love?  Or could love exist without any special concern at all for the well being of its object?  Both claims have been made.  St. Paul suggests that disinterested care is essential when he tells us that love “seeketh not her own.  On the other hand, David Hume sees “no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annexed to love, and of happiness to hatred.”  I argue that Hume’s view is closer to the truth, and I try to show how caring concern (while not essential to love) can develop from a love which consists of intense attraction.

 

The Argument for Mandatory Retirement in Universities

 

This paper examines age discrimination as it arises in the debate about mandatory retirement for university professors.  Various arguments to support mandatory retirement are rejected.  Not so easily rejected, however, is an argument regarding fairness. This argument concludes that people unable to enter academic life because of job scarcity are treated unfairly by those who have had more than enough years as university professors. A key part of the argument hinges on what “more than enough years” means.  In this regard, the paper examines an analogy between distributive policies regarding wealth and distributive policies regarding jobs.

Richard Keshen, CBU

 

The Evolution of Experiments and Experimental Philosophy

 

Abstract:

 

The term "experimental philosophy" has recently come into vogue to describe a movement to bring philosophy "out of the armchair" and into the real world through the use of simple experiments, mostly in the style of behavioral psychology. Looking through history, however, we find that the term "experimental" has been a self-attributed description of various philosophers going all the way back to the originator of the armchair, Descartes himself. What has allowed this broad range of thinkers to consider themselves "experimental" and "scientific" has been the evolution of our understanding of those terms. Accordingly, using insights from feminist epistemology, I will suggest some revisions in our understanding of what an experiment is, so that we can go beyond the current trend of experimental philosophy toward a philosophy that is really able to critique the assumptions of our current society and move it in the direction of greater justice.

 

Carl M. Johnson

Ph.D. student

Philosophy Dept.

University of Hawaii at Manoa

 

Hatred and Liberal Justice

Nathan Brett

Dalhousie University

Many modern democracies have adopted hate crime laws that apply stiffer penalties to crimes motivated by, e.g., racism or homophobia. Some have also adopted hate speech legislation. This paper briefly explores the nature of hatred and considers the justifiability of such laws by reviewing objections that claim hate laws are incompatible with liberal democracy. I will argue that, on the contrary, some hate crime laws are appropriate manifestations of a liberal conception of justice.

 

The Paradoxes of Proslogion 6-13

Michael Fournier

Dalhousie University

michael.fournier@dal.ca

 

Chapters 6-13 of the Proslogion resolve paradoxes concerning the divine attributes that follow from the conclusion that God is whatever is better to be than not to be. I argue that these chapters are also a ring composition:

A  incorporeality

B  power

C  mercy

D  justice

D′ justice

C′ mercy

B′ power

A′ incorporeality

The parallelism of the ring sets up as antitheses two kinds of paradoxes in these chapters—real and apparent. Chapters 6-9 present apparent paradoxes that are dissolved by showing that there is merely a difference of degree in the way that incorporeal perception, power, mercy and justice belong to both God and the human. Chapters 10-13 present real paradoxes that are only resolved by conceding that God’s justice, mercy, power and unlimited incorporeality are different in kind from their human forms and belong singularly to God.

 

Be-coming: Embodied Time and the Phenomenology of Otherness

 

Becoming is an expectation of future being—usually the metaphysical focus has centered on the latter concept, or the characteristics of the being yet to come.  However, there is much space in feminist, queer and phenomenological accounts for an exploration of the former—what is the characteristic of the time of the future that allows for such a becoming to take place spatio-temporally?  What does this future potential mean for an account of embodied time?  What does embodied otherness mean for understanding other bodies?  What does it mean for an understanding of time itself?  In this paper, the authors will endeavor to explore the theme of embodied time by first providing an account of Husserl’s phenomenological examination of protention, next by analyzing Rosi Braidotti’s feminist account of material embodied spatio-temporality, and finally by applying these themes to Judith Halberstam’s accounts of posthuman bodies and queer time and place.  Through this examination, the authors seek to provide a philosophically rigorous and currently relevant argument for the importance of understanding future time and otherness.

 

Taine Duncan, Duquesne University

Harry A. Nethery, Duquesne University

 

 

 

The Unnoticed Prima Facie Duty

Darren Domsky, Texas A&M University

 

If we were to cause Earth’s human population to skyrocket to trillions of barely happy people, this act would be repugnant, even though it would dramatically raise total happiness.  Similarly, if we were to cause future Earth to contain only one self-replicating, constantly ecstatic person (ecstatic, say, because of some perfect future variation of heroine), this also would be a repugnant act, even though it would result in very high average happiness.  Derek Parfit invented these two problems to show that utilitarianism is doomed, but David Schmidtz and Matt Zwolinski convincingly argue that these problems are problems for any theory that would press us--even a little--to promote happiness.  Alan Carter has recently suggested that a pluralistic consequentialism can escape these problems by positing that total and average happiness both matter, but Carter would have to accept a future Earth filled with trillions of perfect heroine addicts as a moral ideal, and obviously it too would be repugnant.  In this paper, I show that a modified version of W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duties nicely explains all of this.  The duty that does all of the work, and that Ross--and, in fact, every human--seems predictably and systematically responsive to but somehow not consciously aware of, is a temporally multiplex duty of non-interference: a duty to leave (and sometimes make) the world be as it would have been had our rational agency suddenly disappeared (as of various times t).  This duty does not rely on any background environmentalism or respect for nature.  On the contrary, it offers us a theoretical explanation of what environmentalism and respect for nature seem to have always ultimately been grounded in.  At the same time, the duty appears to be the (same) missing piece in a variety of infamous puzzles in ethical theory, including many that center--as the repugnant conclusions do--on the ethical status of possible and potential future people.

 

Negotiating the “Call of Duty”:  The impact of video-gaming on human evolution and on parent-child relationships

Pamela Courtenay-Hall, Heather Tasker and Eric Horne, UPEI

In this paper, we explore the impact that video-gaming has on the development of human perceptual habits, language patterns, social patterns and cultural beliefs, and how best to manage these impacts.  We look at the phenomenon of video-gaming both from an evolutionary perspective and from an educational perspective.  Drawing from critical thinking research, our educational aim is to further develop and share methods that will help students achieve a level of “interactivity” with video games that would merit being called “critical video game literacy”— a depth of “literacy” that goes beyond keyboard and controller dexterity, CD interfacing skills and internet navigational expertise, to critical awareness of video-games as unwitting perceptual training systems and powerful cultural messaging systems. As students become more technologically well-informed and internet-smart, we aim to help them also become more socially, culturally, ecologically and educationally reflective about the video-games they get caught up in.  But the most fascinating question is, What changes does video-gaming bring to human cultural evolution?

 

 

Moral Progress

Abstract

On Korsgaard’s view, the question “Why should I be moral?” is best be rephrased as, “What justifies these moral claims on me?” This paper argues that the point of asking "Why should I be moral?" is not to discover if one has particular reasons for adhering to particular dictates of morality. Rather, its aim is to question whether one has a reason for adhering to the dictates of morality. That reason, I maintain, is that one wants to become a certain kind of person, to have a certain character. For the person aiming to have integrity, the reason to be moral is to develop that character protective of that which one considers worth doing as one among many fellow deliberators. In that case, moral reflection is intrinsically normative. But its normativity is not concerned with justifying the dictates of morality; rather, it is concerned with being a certain sort of member of a moral community, the kind of person who is proud to have a standing in that community as a person of integrity.

Sylvia Burrow, CBU

 

The Tree of Death

 

Abstract

The Tree of Death metaphor is a focal point I use to hang certain questions about the meaning of life. The metaphysical structure of trees provides a gateway to the study of existential questions about what it means to be a person and what, if anything, it means to be a person in the afterlife state of death. I can trace the presence of Aquinas, Heidegger, existentialism and phenomenology in my thinking, as well as some of my own rumination in applied ethics and theology. 

Ken Bryson, Ph.D.

 

 

 

Mirror Neurons And The Seat Of Aesthetic Enjoyment

 

When we read a story, watch a drama, see a sculpture and enjoy them we receive aesthetic pleasure. But where does such aesthetic pleasure reside in? Is it in the object? In the mind of the enjoyer? Or is it an ownerless emotion that has no seat at all? Such questions are bothering aesthetists both in the east and west. There are various theories forwarded by philosophers in the west and the east.

In this paper, I would like to show mirror neurons to be the seat of aesthetic enjoyment and how this changes the face of traditional aesthetics .Subjectivisation of the object of aesthetic enjoyment and the generalization of the same, I argue, is absolutely explainable by the concept of mirror neurons. If the mirror neurons are what neurobiologists claim, it is the ultimate answer to the puzzle of aesthetic enjoyment.

 

Aryya Bhattacharya

Vivekananda College for Women

University of Calcutta  

 

Is the Buddhist Theory of Non-Self Conceptually Incoherent?

 

 

Paul Bernier

Département de philosophie

Université de Moncton

Moncton, Nouveau-Brunswick

 

All the philosophical schools of Buddhism, despite their many differences, share a central claim, namely the theory of non-self (anatma). Descartes cogito argument suggests that the claim that there could be thought without a thinking subject is conceptually incoherent. The German aphorist Lichtenberg has suggested that all Descartes could claim to have established was the impersonal “There is thinking” (Es Denkt), which would support the coherence of the Buddhist theory of non-self. But, Bernard Williams has argued that Lichtenberg impersonal version of the cogito is conceptually incoherent, which entails that the Buddhist theory of non-self is conceptually incoherent. I propose to defend Lichtenberg’s claim, and hence the Buddhist theory of non-self, against Williams’s argument.

 

Moral Progress, Moral Agatheism and Metatheodicy: Might the Imperfection of Morality be to blame for the Alleged Imperfection of God?

Michael Ashfield, MA (Acadia University)

 

ABSTRACT

The cognitive-developmental theory of moralization, advanced by the late American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, suggests that consequentialist morality is both developmentally prior and ethically inferior to deontological morality.  For this reason, Kohlberg’s model of moral progress seems to corroborate the alleged inadequacy of older attempts to justify God’s permission of evil by means of appeals to global goods.  The growing concern that theodicies rely upon appropriately agent-centered goods seems to confirm a widespread, though not unanimous, dissatisfaction with the consequentialist moral understandings that underlie so many theodicies.  Yet, despite the satisfaction of Kohlberg and others with the supposed ethical supremacy of deontological morality, other thinkers have suggested the possibility of a still higher ethical stage, beyond consequentialism, deontology and even beyond justice itself, centered on completely self-giving, other-affirming love (i.e. agape).  Accordingly, I sketch a response to the entire theodical debate in terms of an agapic understanding of divine goodness.

 

The Evolution of Wittgenstein’s Conception of Normativity

(or Facts, Facts and Facts—and Ethics)

 

Emily Bingeman

Dalhousie University

 

Between writing the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1922 and the Philosophical Investigations in 1953, Wittgenstein’s thinking is thought by many to have undergone a radical change.  In his forthcoming book Wittgenstein on the Practice of Philosophy Michael Hymers has argued that this shift can be largely characterized by a change in Wittgenstein’s conception of normativity. My aim today will be to track changes in Wittgenstein’s thought on normativity in the two major works mentioned above and in the Lecture on Ethics, a transitionary text recorded from a lecture given by Wittgenstein in 1929. My purpose is to gain a clear picture of the later Wittgenstein’s conception of normativity by contrast to his early and transitionary periods. With this clear picture in hand I will argue that the normative claims that I take Wittgenstein to be making in the Philosophical Investigations should be thought of as ethically normative claims. 

 

MANAGEMENT OF LOGICIANS AND PHILOSOPHERS

 

The following is an abstract of the paper:

 

The paper draws attention to the ever-changing administrative contexts in which logicians and philosophers have operated, and to the impacts of these contexts on their work.  There follows discussion of the lessons that can be learnt regarding progress and regression in logic and philosophy.

 

Thank you for organizing the conference.  I assume that details regarding fees, registration, etc. will be communicated in due course through your website, but if I am wrong about that please let me know such details by e-mail to:

 

Robert Ansell,

Philosophy Department,

Saint Mary's University,

Halifax, N.S.

 

 

The Need For Evil

ARPA Abstract

 

Some philosophers believe we should abandon the concept of evil: that the term ‘evil’ should not be used in moral, social, or political discussions, and that ethical theorists should not concern themselves with the concept of evil. These philosophers believe that the concept of evil is useless, dangerous, essentially incomprehensible, or carries unwanted, or unwarranted, metaphysical baggage. This position has been labelled evil-skepticism. In this paper I argue against evil-skepticism. I argue that the concept of evil is needed to refer to immoral extremes and that it need not be unacceptably dangerous. Further, I argue that plausible theories of evil do not make evil essentially incomprehensible  or carry unwanted, or unwarranted, metaphysical baggage. To help make my case, I sketch a plausible theory of evil.

Todd Calder, St. Mary’s

 

 

 

MORAL EVOLUTION IN HUMAN GOVERNANCE: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

Moral theory and practice has evolved according to human political, social and environmental circumstances.  Rule-governed societies with constitutions and laws encourage particular types of moral action among citizens.  This project is concerned with current day practices of moral action and how moral theory, which is used today in practice, is outdated and requires further investigation in adjusting our rule-governed society’s concept of moral consideration.  The extent to which “natural selection”[1] plays in developing moral duty in human agents may be hindered by socio-economic and political circumstances whereby human agents survival mechanisms are based on earning currency, apart from direct environmental dependence and cooperation with other agents.  The current political, social and environmental circumstances in which humans govern themselves are leading us to assess the action of individuals and organizations through Alan Gewirth’s “dialectically necessary method”[2], in light of a departure from MacIntyre’s virtue-based method of ascertaining moral actions.

 

Paul Teleki – (705) 876-9540

Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Ontario

 

 

“Saying How You Feel: Women and Men on Sexual Arousal and Sexual Desire”

Robert Scott Stewart, Ph.D.

Professor and Chair of Philosophy

Cape Breton University

Sydney, Nova Scotia

Canada

 

Recent research on sexual arousal and desire uncovers interesting differences between men and women. Men are “category specific.” That is, their physiological and subjective responses regarding sex match. Hence, a heterosexual man will typically get an erection only when he is shown pictures/video/etc. of women and of lesbian or heterosexual sexual activity. Moreover, when asked, this is what a man says arouses him. Women, in contrast, display a marked difference between their objective and subjective reactions. Women typically say that almost no pictures/videos/etc. sexually arouse them: however, they lubricate at displays of almost anything – from hetero and homosexual sexual activities to presentations even of bonobos having sex.  This paper explores this difference to inquire into the possible dissimilarities between sexual arousal and sexual desire, how they may differ between men and women, and what role biology and social constructionism have to play in what sexually arouses men and women and what they find sexually desirous.

 

Michael D. Doan

Contact Information:

Address: 6046 Inglis St., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, B3H 1L3

Phone: (902) 440-8530

 

Institutional Affiliation:

Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University

 

Title: “What Sort of ‘Cognitivist’ was Robert C. Solomon? The Development of Solomon’s Emotion Theory”

 

Field: Emotion Theory

Abstract: Robert C. Solomon (1942-2007) was a pioneer in twentieth century emotion theory; but given his tremendous influence on the field, it is surprising how often his “cognitivist” position has been misunderstood or misrepresented in the philosophical literature.  For example, because of his emphasis on the notion of “judgment” it has been claimed that Solomon analyzes emotions into sets of propositional attitudes, so it has seemed natural to draw comparisons to Donald Davidson’s (1976) and Martha Nussbaum’s (1994, 2001) cognitive theories of the emotions.  This trend has contributed to the marginalization of some of Solomon’s more significant insights, and in this essay I set myself the task of retrieving them while distinguishing his peculiar brand of cognitivism.  I divide Solomon’s work on emotion into “early” (1973-2001) and “later” (2001-2007) phases, and argue that there are two answers to the question, “What sort of ‘cognitivist’ was Robert C. Solomon?”, the second of which sheds new light on his theoretical legacy.

 

 

Parts of the Word or Parts of the Machine

The problems confronting the science of nature change depending on how its practitioners conceive of the parts of things. In this paper I discuss two ways of thinking about parts: the Ancient Greek conception of elements as letters, and the Modern conception of things as machines.

The first recognizably scientific accounts of things were accomplished by drawing an analogy between writing and things: the word for ‘element’ is the word for ‘letter.’ The discovery of the elements in Greek Philosophy is a revolution in the conception of parts and wholes and therefore of science, so the first part of this paper discusses the way that Plato uses written words as models for the way parts fit together into whole things.

The second part of this paper works out how the machine changes the concept of nature and its parts. Early Modern science is recognizable through a new metaphor for the workings of nature: the machine and its correlative concepts of force and law, cause and effect.

The paper closes with a sketch of our current model of the physical world—indefinite energy—and discusses possible implications of this conception of things.

Mark Sentesy

Boston College

(617) 879-3149

 

What is Modal Logic?

 

Abstract:

This paper is a continuation of my "What is Logic?" which was presented at the last ARPA meeting. In the new paper I continue to argue that the proper algebra of logic is category theory, by showing that the most comprehensive and fruitful approach to modality involves the use of the (category theoretic) notion of adjoint functors, sometimes called "adjoint situations." In particular, if we agree to treat a logic as a concrete category (in the manner of Lambek and Scott) then necessity turns out to be adjoint to truth, in a sense to be made precise in this paper.

Peter K. Schotch
Munro Professor of Metaphysics
Department of Philosophy
Dalhousie University
Halifax, NS B3H 4P9  CANADA

 

 

 

John Stuart Mill, the Marketplace of Ideas, and Survival of the Fittest

John Stuart Mill’s passionate call for diversity of hypotheses in chapter two of On Liberty is often identified with the “marketplace of ideas”, and the competition among hypotheses that Mill advocates is frequently assimilated to the Darwinian selection process leading to “survival of the fittest.”  I shall argue that the model of diversity and competition advocated by Mill is fundamentally different from both the “marketplace” and Darwinian models.  The failure to recognize these differences continues to generate serious errors in philosophy of science.

Kathleen Okruhlik, University of Western Ontario

 

 

 

Abstract

“A Block to Progress: Dewey and Russell on Immediate Knowledge”

This paper suggests an alternative reason for the eventual breakdown and ultimate intractability of the debate on truth between John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. Their exchange has been characterized as a failure because neither thinker made a serious attempt to get at the heart of his opponent’s position. This is not my view. Instead, I argue that from very early on there was an unacknowledged and implicit requirement that each man abandon his entire theory of immediate knowledge. From the outset, the possibility for dialogue and agreement on even technical points was blocked. The status of immediate knowledge was so fundamental to each of their theories that any shift in ground would topple the entire structure. Nothing less than this fundamental shift could have permitted real discussion between them, since discussion demanded one man to see an entire philosophical project through the eyes of the other.

Robbie Moser

Mount Allison University

 

How Reasons Explain Actions

Mark Mercer

Saint Mary’s University

Abstract: Anomalous monism is the doctrine that while each individual mental event is a physical event, no mental property of an event is a physical property.  Critics contend that anomalous monism, when coupled with the premises from which Donald Davidson argues to it and the thesis that the mental properties of events supervene on their physical properties, makes it impossible for us to understand just how by citing the reasons that cause an action we manage to explain that action.  I argue against this contention by showing, first, that reason explanations are dispositional explanations and, as such, are possessed of all the explanatory force of dispositional explanations, and, second, that the claim that reason explanations are dispositional explanations is entirely consistent with anomalous monism.