Reasonable Self-Esteem

McGill-Queen's University Press. Available through http://www.Amazon.ca

Preface

In this book I describe a moral ideal which I call Reasonable Self-Esteem and argue that this ideal can be productive of a desirable life. The book is divided into two parts. In Part One, I describe how a person committed to Reasonableness can analyze his self-esteem. I argue that, through this analysis, such a person is disposed to cultivate certain personality traits and to reject others. For example, he is disposed to cultivate autonomy and to reject envy; to cultivate self-esteem grounded in individual achievement, and to reject relationships grounded in unequal moral status. In Part Two, I argue that the relevant traits can be elements of a meaningful life. I describe how a person with Reasonable Self-Esteem can feel herself part of a worthy tradition, acquire a sense of dignity, and contribute to the good of others. In the end, then, I aim to demonstrate the appeal of a life in which Reasonableness is a central commitment.

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: REASONS FOR SELF-ESTEEM

Chapter One: Self-Esteem and the Reasonable Person........Page 2
The concept of a reason for self-esteem is defined. Six Guidelines for rationally scrutinizing reasons are described. The Reasonable Person, or RP, is defined as a person who cares about following these Guidelines. The connection between self-esteem and motivation is analyzed.

Chapter Two: Reflected Reasons...........................Page 33
The impact of others' evaluations on our self-esteem is analyzed. The concept of a reflected reason is defined. The reflected reason is shown to underlie the trait of other-dependency. The RP rejects reflected self-evaluations as out of keeping with her nature, and in the process inhibits other-dependency in herself. The RP finds that autonomy is in keeping with her nature.

Chapter Three: Competitive Reasons.....................Page 60
Competitive reasons for self-esteem are analyzed and shown to underlie envy. The RP rejects competitive reasons as out of keeping with his nature, and so inhibits envy in himself. Self-evaluations involving adjectives such as "poor,", "good" and "excellent" are shown to be distinct from competitive self-evaluations.

Chapter Four: Identification Reasons..................Page 86
Reasons for self-esteem grounded in social relationships are analyzed. Self-evaluations which imply that an agent has less moral status than another entity are shown to be out of keeping with the RP's nature. The RP's ambivalent relationship to group membership is described.

Chapter Five: Inherent Reasons......................Page 118
Reasons for self-esteem involving qualities we conceive as issuing from ourselves are analyzed. Such qualities are the basis for what I call inherent reasons for self-esteem. The notion of "issuing from ourself" is analyzed. It is shown that appreciation of what has intrinsic worth can be as much the basis for an inherent reason as voluntary acts. The trait of attaching importance to one's being a unique person is analyzed. It is shown that the RP is disposed to have this trait.

PART TWO: ELEMENTS IN A WAY OF LIFE

Chapter Six: Finding Meaning in Reasonableness.......Page 152
Self-respect is distinguished from self-esteem. It is argued that being a self-respecting teacher, carpenter, etc. involves attributing positive worth to a tradition or quasi-tradition. It is shown that Reasonableness can be thought of as a tradition. Hence, the RP can have the benefit of seeing herself as self-respecting qua RP. It is argued that part of the tradition of Reasonableness includes science. It is shown how the RP of a certain temperament has meaning added to her life through contributing to science, either by being a scientist herself or by being a genuine appreciator of science.

Chapter Seven: Egalitarian Respect.....................Page 194
The attitude of treating people as equals, or egalitarian respect, is interpreted. Egalitarian respect is bifurcated into two further attitudes: the belief that one does not count for less than others, which is the attitude of egalitarian self-respect; and the belief that one does not count for more than others, which is the attitude of other-respect. These attitudes are analyzed in terms of five criteria. It is argued that neither Kantian nor utilitarian strategies can be successful in justifying egalitarian respect in such a way that the attitude can be deeply anchored in our personalities.

Chapter Eight: "I Do Not Count for Less"............Page 229
This chapter argues that the RP, on account of her nature, is particularly suited to having egalitarian self-respect.

Chapter Nine: "I Do Not Count for More"..............Page 248
This chapter argues that the RP's nature is congruent with other-respect. Other-respect, in its fullest sense, is grounded in perspective-creating experiences; that is, experiences which cause us to see any other person as an equal. Two such experiences are discussed: a)our common mortality; and b)our common subjection to fortune. It is argued that the RP's nature dismantles barriers in himself which often cause people not to take such experiences to heart. It is then argued that the Guidelines dispose the RP to give expression to egalitarian perceptions. For these reasons, other-respect has expressive significance for the RP, and so is integrated into his self-esteem.